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Introduction
This paper examines the extent to which the American states spend
LEAA ( Law Enforcement Assistance Administration) block grants in
response to growing crime rates and/or the public's desire to halt the
increasing number of criminal violations. Our principal concern is
whether or not states , as block grant recipients , are allocating this
federal aid in a way that could be characterized as responsive to either
public opinion or the targeted problem, i.e., crime.
The federal government established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration block grant program under Title I of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ( Public Law
90-351 ) .1 This law, to a great extent, was a response to the public
concern with crime manifested in the late 1960's. Not only were citizens
inundated with rhetoric by the FBI and others indicating such occurrences were increasing , but the civil disorders of 1967 and 1968, as well
as the assassinations of President John Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King, caused many people to fear for their
personal safety, even in localities where evidence indicated persons were
only rarely the victims of violent acts. 2 Thus, it is not too surprising that
in 1968 crime was viewed by Americans as being the number one
domestic problem .3 This public attitude is credited with having significant political consequences, including its effect upon the outcome
of several elections, such as the 1968 presidential contest. 4
0
We wish to thank Harvey Marshall for his helpful comments on the methodology employed in this paper.
1 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Statutes atl Large, Vol
82 (1968), pp. 191-209;
2 Fred P. Graham, "A Contemporary History of American Crime," in Hugh
Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The Historfj of Violence in America (New
York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 495-496.
8 American Institute for Public Opinion, The Gallup Poll-1935-1971
(New
York: Random House, 1972), p. 2107.
4 Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg , The Real ,Majority (New York:
Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1970).
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Evidence indicates the fears of individuals were not merely the result of proclamations made by J. Edgar Hoover and several candidates
for elective office, however. The level of violent crimes began increasing
drastically, especially robbery which nearly always involves a confrontation between persons not known to each other , and includes the threat
of bodily harm, if not the actual use of force. Moreover, the number
of persons being injured during robberies has also grown. In short, the
fear of being victimized not only is greater than it was 10 or 15 years
ago, the probability of becoming a crime statistic also is higher than in
the past, particularly in major metropolitan areas. 5
Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration program ,
money is apportioned among the states on a per capita basis for the
general purpose of alleviating crime by improving the processes of
criminal justice. 6 States are to spend their grants for individual projects
intended to improve the effectiveness of various criminal justice agencies.
In order to qualify for these monies, a state must establish a state
planning agency (SPA) under the control of the governor. States receive
each year's grant when the LEAA approves the comprehensive plan
which has been prepared and adopted by that agency. This unit then is
authorized to make "subgrants" to state and local law enforcement
agencies. 7
5

Graham, op. cit., 502-504; and Marvin Wolfgang, "Urban Crime," in James

Q. Wilson, The Metropolitan Enigma (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,

1970), pp. 292-296.
6 Statutes at Large, op. cit., 197-199. For a discussion of the regulations governing the operation of this block grant program see Edward J. Clynch, Law Enf01Cement Assistance Administration Bwck Grants: A Policy Analysis ( unpublished Ph .D.
dissertation, Purdue University, 1974), chapter 2. The law establishes block grants:
one for planning purposes ( planning grants ) and one for funding criminal justice
projects ( action grants). This work deals exclusively with the action grants and all
references to block grants refer to this type of allocation.
7 Clnych, op. cit., Statutes at Large, op. cit. The requirement that subgrants be
awarded on the basis of a comprehensive plan, approved by the LEAA, gives federal
administrators some potential control over how these resources are utilized. LEAA officials, however, have imposed very few programmatic controls on state planning
agencies. States are free to determine how block grants are divided among different
parts of the criminal justice system, provided some resources are channel ed to each
segment. LEAA oversight is mostly concerned with operating procedur es rather than
substantive spending decisions. However, the federal agency does monitor state
spending to insure funds are utilized in accordance with the comprehensive plan
developed by the SPA. In essence, states may decide how they wish to distribute
block grant resources, but a plan must be submitted to the LEAA and accepted by
that agency. Furthermore, actual spending is expected to be guided by this document.
The existence of regional planning units ( RPU) within each state also raises
questions about the state being the appropriate unit of analysis. To date , SPA willingness to accept RPU spending recommendations without alteration has not been
clarified by a comprehensive cross-state analysis. Studies of individual or a few
states seem to indicate that the decision-making role of RPU's varies. In any case,
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LEAA block grants provide states not only with money, but also
with the flexibility to fund projects intended to alleviate criminal activity of concern to their citizens. This research, it should be emphasized, does not evaluate the impact of block grant spending on the
incidence of crime. Rather, it assesses whether or not allocation decisions are based on public sentiment and/ or crime rates, the available
measure of the targeted problem.

Dependent Variables
Statewide expenditure data are the measures of policy output
utilized in this study. The LEAA requires states to classify expenditures
by a number of functional categories. From these data we have selected
two specific indicators for inclusion as dependent variables in our
analysis: ( 1) the percentage of LEAA funds spent on crime prevention,
and ( 2) the proportion of this aid allocated for detection and apprehension of alleged criminals. We have chosen these indicators because
they primarily represent spending for projects intended to reduce crime
through improving police effectiveness. Crime increases could lead to
states favoring projects for any of the parts of law enforcement, but we
believe an important question to be answered is whether or not the
level of support for police-related undertakings are affected by the
targeted problems. The police, among all segments of the criminal
justice system, are ". . . viewed as the prime actors for reducing
crime ... " 8 Demands for more "law and order," moreover, usually
it appears that the state remains a relevant actor. All projects funded must have the
approval of the state planning agency. This unit must, at a minimum, co-ordinate
RPU spending requests on the basis of the state's plan. See Law and Disorder III,
(Washington, D. C.: Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, April 1972),
pp. 13-15; U. S. Congress, House, Block Grant Programs of the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, 92nd Congress, 2nd sess., 1972, pp. 48-60; and Malcolm
Feeley, Austin Sarat and Susan White, "Implementation of the Safe Streets Act:
The Role of State Planning in the Development of Criminal Justice Federalism, paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, Illinois, May 1976, pp. 14-15.
8 Police anti-crime task forces, for example, have been established with the
objective of deterring potential offenders from committing violations of the law. In
addition, projects are being financed with LEAA resources to eliminate obvious
opportunities for infractions, such as efforts to upgrade street lighting in high crime
areas. The police are also introducing programs intended to encourage individuals
to take steps having the likelihood of reducing the chances of an illegal entry. Doorto-door inspections of homes and businesses are conducted by trained officers and
campaigns are being undertaken to encourage persons to mark their possessions with
an identification number which is registered with law enforcement officials. See
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, A National,
Strategy to Reduce Crime (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Justice, 1973),
pp. 94-96 and 108; and John McKay of the National League of Cities, private
interview with Edward J. Clynch, February 25, 1975.
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are accompanied by hard-line solutions such as increasing the ability
of the police to detect and apprehend criminals.
These categories, at the same time, involve two very different
strategies for reducing crime through police actions. Items included
under crime prevention are "proactive," referring to steps taken to minimize the likelihood of illegal acts ever occurring. Detection and apprehension expenditures, by comparison, reflect a "reactive" approach to
"crime in the streets." Here the focus is upon reducing the incidence of
illegal activities by increasing police effectiveness in arresting individuals, who may have committed a crime. By incorporating both types of
measures in our analysis, we should be able to assess policy responses
which have been "proactive" or "reactive" in nature. The total number
of states included in the present research is 43, since seven states did
not report their expenditures on the form suggested by the LEAA. 9
The data employed were for the year 1970, the first year a substantial
amount of federal money was transferred to the states under this program.10 Most of the 1970 allocation was completely expended at the
time these data were gathered. 11

Independent Variables
The notion of responsiveness will be conceptualized in two different
ways as indicated in the introductory section. First, we may impart an
interpretation derived from democratic philosophy. That is to say, states
implementing policies consistent with public opinion can be labelled
"responsive." Congruence with mass preferences, then, becomes the
relevant assessment criterion. Second, states and local communities can
respond to the specific policy problems under consideration, rather than
what the citizenry believe is an appropriate course of action. In this
instance, policies would be determined directly by the increases in
criminal activity, and not by public opinion.
We encounter significant difficulty in attempting to operationalize
our first definition of responsiveness. Essentially, we must construct indices of mass preferences regarding responses to increased crime in
9 During 1970, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming did not use the budgetary form suggested by the LEAA. Therefore our
analysis was performed on an N of 43.
10 The dollar amounts of federal money allocated during the first three years of
the program are as follows: 1969-$24 million; 1970-$183 million; and 197,1-$340
million. See Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 5th Annual RepOf't,
(Washington, D. C.: Department of Justice, May 1973), p. 2.
11 At the time the data were collected in May 1973, the average proportion of
the LEAA funds which had been spent by the states was 98.6 percent for 1969;
90.9 percent for 1970; and 70.4 percent for 1971.
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the streets. More precisely, we would like to know how the public
would wish to see the LEAA funds distributed across the functional
categories of expenditure. Regrettably , we do not have state-by-state
public opinion polls accurately measuring the policy preferences of the
citizenry with respect to this block grant program.
We can calculate, however, a very general, crude indicator of public
attitude regarding the "law and order " problem by a computer simulation
methodology developed by the M.I.T. Simulmatics Project, 12 and elaborated upon by Ronald E. Weber. 13 This technique allows the researcher
to translate national survey results into state-by-state estimates of the
preferences of eligible electorates. 14 For any item included in a national
opinion poll , one can compute the distribution of attitudes for each
state, even though representative samples were not drawn for all states
included in the analysis.
We, therefore, can estimate the extent to which there is a general
belief or desire to increase police protection in order to deal with "crime
in the streets." To do so, we relied upon the following question which
appeared on a Gallup Poll administered in 1968:
In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the nation's crime
rate. What steps do you think should be taken to reduce crime? 1 ~
This was an open-ended question , permitting a myriad of responses.
Consequently, we selected the type of answer which expressed a preference for "more law enforcement ," "more police," "more police protection,"
"more power for the police," or "less restrictions on the police" as most
reflective of the public's desire to do something about crime in the streets,
the very purpose for which the LEAA block grant system was instituted.
The percentage of each state 's eligible electorate who felt the answer
to mounting street crimes was an increase in police protection and law
12 See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates,
Issues, & Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential
Elections (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 196.5).
13 See Ronald E . Weber, Public Policy Preferences in the States (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Institute of Public Adininistration, 1971); and Ronald
E . Weber . Anne H. Hopkins, Michael L. Mezey and Frank J. Munger, "Computer
Simulation of State Electorates ," Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (Winter, 1972-73) ,
pp. 549-565.
14 This methodology generates estimates of statewide opinion on the basis of
national survey data by ( 1) using an additive model to compute the attitudes of
regional voter-types, ( 2) attributing the regional voter-type preferences to the votertypes in each stat e within the region, ( 3) multiplying the attributed opinion to the
frequency of the voter-type in each state, and ( 4) calculating a weighted average
of the products over all voter-types in each state.
111AIPO 757, January 30, 1968.
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enforcement is estimated by subjecting this survey item to the simulation
methodology cited above.
The second notion of responsiveness focuses upon the ability to
devote money and effort to the problem, namely crime in the streets,
rather than public opinion regarding the allocation of funds. The utilization of the LEAA block grants may indicate the extent to which · states
are responding directly to the growth in criminal infractions.
The measure of crime for this study is a factor score which reHects
changes in robbery during the 1965 to 1968 period. 16 We are hypothesizing that policy outputs would most likely be linked to increases in
violations, rather than levels of recorded offenses, since the growing
crime rate prompted the LEAA block grant program. An indicator reHecting increases in robbery has been selected because this is the
stranger-related offense causing the most concern about "crime in the
streets." 1 7 Increases in this infraction, almost always involving a confrontation between a victim and an unknown assailant, are viewed as being
responsible for much of the fear about crime expressed by many citizens.
In short, although the monetary loss to society from these actions is only
a small fraction of the total cost of crime, the psychic damage created
by these acts appears to be substantial. 18
In order to assess the impact of increases in crime and public opinion
upon LEAA expenditures, we shall apply path analysis to the model
depicted in Figure 1.

FIGURE

1

Simple Path Model
16 This indicator has been created by the factor analysis of a number of crime
statistics. See Clynch. op. cit., pp. 109-119. The use of crime statistics as a measure
of criminal activity is the subject of continuing controversy. However, if officials
are going to spend LEAA resources in response to crime, crime statistics are the
only hard measure of these happenings at their disposal. For a discussion of the use
of crime statistics in social science research see Wesley G. Skogan, "The Validity
of Official Crime Statistics: An Empirical Investigation," Social Science Quarterly,
55 (June, 1974).
17 A National Strategy to Reduce Crime, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
18 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
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In the ensuing analysis, we shall partition the impact of crime increase into its direct and indirect effects. For public opinion we shall
compute both direct and spurious effects. In both cases, the direct effects
are equivalent to the path coefficients or beta weights.
Furthermore, we anticipate certain environmental or political factors
to foster or impede responsiveness in the expenditure of LEAA funds.
For example, the extent to which a state is heterogeneous with respect
to community size and income ("Development Heterogeneity") might
encourage greater sensitivity to increased crime rates and public demand
for solutions. 19 Likewise , a political factor which may be of special
significance is the degree of innovativeness of a state. Presumably, more
innovative systems can respond more readily to a newly-emerging or
rapidly growing problem. 2 ° Finally, states which are highly professionalized and locally reliant may be able to react more directly to greater
criminal activity and public opinion. 21
To assess the effects of these socioeconomic and political variables,
we shall compute path model results, while controlling for a social or
political factor. For example, the model will be evaluated for above
average development heterogeneity states, and then for below average
development heterogeneity states. The same approach will be utilized
for the political system variables.
Findings
The results for the path models employing crime prevention expenditures as the dependent variable are reported in Table 1. Clearly,
for all 43 states included in the analysis, the increase in robbery does
have a moderate direct effect upon crime prevention expenditures. However, virtually no indirect effects emerge, even though robbery increases
appear to produce a greater public desire for more police protection.
The opinion variable has a non-significant path coefficient which is,
nevertheless, in the expected direction.
19 This socioeconomic characteristic is measured by a factor score labelled "Development Heterogeneity. " For an explanation of the factor score, see Eric M.
Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The 'Politics' of Redistribution: Towards a Model
of the Policy-Making Process in the American States," American PoUtics Quarterly,
Vol. 3, (April 1975), pp. 142 and 169.
20 We shall utilize Walker's innovation score. For a complete discussion of the
index, see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the Amei:;can
States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( September 1969 ), pp. 882-883.
21 For a description of the profe ssionalism-local reliance measure we have employed in this study, see Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of
State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy" Am erican Political Science Review,
63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879.
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TABLE I

Path Analyses for Responsiveness Models With
Crime Prevention Expenditures as Dependent Variable
( Socio-Economic or Political System Control)
Crime
to
Opinion
Path
Indirect

Robbery Increases E.iects
Direct

.438

.352

.086

.348

.370

.247

.123

.. .528

.397

.131

.419

.479

.313

.166

.. .202
.373
.327

.190
.343
.323

.012
.030
.004

.086
.114
.414

.158
.300
.144

.142
.261
.010

.016
.039
.134

.622

.473

.149

.508

.533

.293

.240

.. .160

.140

.020

.127

.172

.154

.018

..

.

.

Total

Direct Spurious

Total

Controls•
All States ( 43) . . . . .
High Development
Heterogeneity ( 26)
Low Development
Heterogeneity ( 17)
High Innovation (21)
Low Innovation ( 22)
High ProfessionalismLow Reliance (19)
Low ProfessionalismLocal Reliance ( 24)

Public Opinion E.iects

• Numberof states in parentheses .

TABLE 2

Path Analyses for Responsiveness Models With
Detection/ Apprehension Expenditures as Dependent Variable
( Socio-Economic or Political System Controls)
Crime
to
Opinion
Direct Indirect Path

Robbery Increases E.iects

Controls 0
All States ( 43)
High Development
Heterogeneity ( 26)
Low Development
Heterogen eity ( 17)
High Innovation ( 21 )
Low Innovation ( 22)
High ProfessionalismLocal Reliance ( 19)
Low Professionalism0

Total

Public Opinion E.iects
Total

Direct Spurious

.089

.045

.046

.348

.140

.124

.016

.. .099

.052

.047

.419

.132

.110

.022

.344
.. .022
.. .267

.327
.011
.174

.017
.011
.093

.086
.114
.414

.232
.100
.297

.202
.099
.225

.029
.001
.072

.. .060

- .096

.156

.508

.258

.307

- .049

Number of states in par entheses .

Turn ing to the path models with controls employed , we find that in
above avera ge development heterogeneity states the proportion of LEAA
funds devoted to crime prevention seems to be spent in direct response to
robb ery increases. Again, public opinion has a non-significant, but posi-
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tive impact. By way of contrast, neither of the independent variables has
a bearing upon crime prevention expenditures in low development
heterogeneity states. Perhaps states which are less diverse with respect
to community size and income do not have highly developed police
departments which can focus more of their attention and money on
preventive measures. As a result , no systematic response to increased
robbery is forthcoming.
Although controls for innovativeness yield no significant effects for
either growing crime rates or public opinion , in high professionalismlocal reliance states, the amount of funds allocated for crime prevention
measures is substantially determined by increases in robbery. P~rhaps the
more professionalized and locally reliant environments have the capabilities , expertise and skills to identify and react to problems confronting decision-makers.
Even a cursory inspection of Table 2 will indicate that the percentage of a state's LEAA funds devoted to detection and apprehension
is responsive to neither increases in robbery nor the desire for more
protection by the public. Clearly, decision-makers are responding to
different cues when they allocate LEAA money for this type of police
activity.
Summary and Conclusion
In general, we have found that increased robbery leads to greater
proportions of LEAA money being allocated for crime prevention, but
not for detection and apprehension. However, soaring crime rates do
not indirectly determine either category of expenditure through public
opinion. Overall, increased criminal activity has had a bearing upon the
preferences of the citizenry, but these views, in turn, do not appear to
have a direct effect on LEAA expenditures.
In a limited way , the path models computed with controls for
selected socioeconomic and political factors may have some relevance
for this area of public policy. We have observed for crime prevention
activities that both high development heterogeneity and above average
professionalism -local reliance states are quite responsive when allocating
LEAA funds. From a pragmatic standpoint , the social and economic
characteristics are not easily manipulated , but the degree of professionalization may be more readily controlled. Thus , if responsiveness is a
high priority in criminal justice programs, then we would contend that
states ought to seek to maximize professionalism and local initiative in
the policy-making process.

